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Abstract 
This article analyses why informal labourers working ‘at the margins’ of global production 
networks lack ‘structural’ and ‘associational’ power. It does so in order to better understand 
potential changes in their material and political conditions, and as part of broader calls to put 
labour at the centre of development studies. The article focuses on rural-based labourers in 
south India who work relatively invisibly as agricultural labourers, informal factory workers, 
and on the construction sites of a ‘global city’ (Bangalore). It deploys a three-way labour 
control regime framework that encompasses i) the macro- labour control regime, which is 
ultimately defined by capitalist relations of production, and characterized in India by 
particularly high levels of informality (precarious and largely unregulated work) and 
segmentation (due to the fragmentary impact of caste); ii) the local labour control regime, 
which refers to how class relations in specific places are shaped by patterns of accumulation 
and work (themselves shaped by differences in agro-ecology, irrigation, and remoteness from 
non-agricultural labour markets), distributions of classes and castes, and the uneven presence 
of the state; and iii) the labour process, which is increasingly marked by forms of ‘remote 
control’ marshalled by labour intermediaries. Debate on the macro-labour control regime and 
on the labour process is well established, but little has been said about local labour control 
regimes, which are newly defined here and discussed in terms of differences between 
‘wetland/circulation zones’ and ‘dryland/commuting zones’. The article identifies locations 
                                                                 




where labour has greater potential structural and associational power. Increased worker 
organisation in these areas could have knock-on effects in more ‘obscure’ sites.  
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Introduction: labour at the margins 
The wave of literature on global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks (GPNs) has 
contributed much to understandings of changing structures of production and geographies of power in 
contemporary capitalism.1  Labour geographers and political economists have sought an increased 
focus on labour’s role within these processes.2 It has been argued that labour, ‘as the ultimate source 
of value’, must be central to the analysis of global production networks, which are ‘as much systems 
of embodied labour as they are interlinked systems of firms’.3 As well as drawing on labour process 
theory and its emphasis of ‘dynamics of control, consent and resistance at the point of 
production’, 4  the analysis extends to ‘local labour regimes’ and ‘macro- level political 
economy’.5 In other words connections are made between workplaces, the state and ‘broader 
social structures’ and ‘economic landscapes’.6  
This article defines ‘the margins’ of global production networks as sites of production where 
labourers work informally, relatively invisibly, and with little ‘structural’ or ‘associational’ 
power. 7 It analyses these conditions in order to better understand potential improvements in 
labour’s material and political conditions. Material conditions refer to poverty (or its absence), 
while political conditions refer to the capacity for collective organisation in pursuit of shared 
interests. Explanations of the levels of labour’s organisation, its degrees of success, the 
breadth and sustainability of its impacts, and the search for routes to more fundamental 
change are central to pro-labouring class analysis. The location of labour within commodity 
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chains,8 the structure of the chain,9 the configuration of class relations at the local level, and the ways 
in which labour is controlled within production processes all have a bearing on labour’s ability to act 
collectively to defend or advance its position (its ‘associational power’).10  
Capital and labour interact within what is an inherently antagonistic relationship. Capital 
seeks to maximise productivity while minimising its costs (labour-power and labour 
embedded in the means of production), in its relentless drive to accumulate. In response, 
labour, as individuals and collectives, follows strategies of compliance and/or resistance in its 
search for improved conditions. The interplay of the agency of capital and labour has contrasting 
and often non-linear outcomes: workers’ collective action can prompt gains for labour,11 but can also 
undermine it by re-working spatial and technological fixes in ways that alter the forms and locations 
of production through outsourcing, subcontracting, and the relocation of production to sites where 
labour is less organized and wages are lower.12  
Overt antagonism between classes is characterized by scale and reach. Hence where heightened 
collective action by workers is more generalized, as in recent years in China,13 the responses are more 
complex and the consequences felt internationally. Short-lived isolated episodes, on the other hand, 
may not even cause ripples within a district.14  
The inherent antagonism of the capital-labour relation is embedded in different ways along global 
value chains, reflecting ‘the dialectics of global-local’ relations, and its rootedness in the ‘territoriality’ 
of concrete socio-political contexts.15 These include class-based organisation and interventions 
by the state (which is understood in this context as a set of institutions expressing contested 
class relations that are at once locally specific and world-historical). For example, apple-
pickers located at one end of ‘buyer-driven’ (European supermarket-driven) commodity 
chains in South Africa have seen deteriorating conditions, 16 while mostly unionized grape-
pickers in north-east Brazil supplying European supermarkets have used their proximity to 
time-sensitive export windows as a basis for heightened bargaining power that has 
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contributed to improved conditions. 17  In West Bengal state investment in irrigation has 
tightened labour markets and strengthened the socio-political and socio-economic position of 
some labourers.18 Elsewhere, gains and losses are less stable and less clear-cut as capitalists 
undermine advances made by labour.19  
As well as a political geography of collective action that has impacts of varying visibility, 
longevity and import, there is another larger political geography of an absence of labouring 
class action and organisation. Here labourers work at the margins of global production 
networks with relatively little associational or structural power.  Amongst them are the rural-
based labouring class households that are the subject of this article. Based in villages in two 
districts in south India (Dharwad and Raichur), they work in i) their home villages, ii) nearby 
cities that they commute to on a daily basis; or iii) remote cities that they migrate to on a 
circular basis for a number of months or years (see map). Most of these labouring class 
households are spread across different sites at any point in time (one member of a household 
working in a city, for example, while others work in a village), and move across sites as 
individuals or groups over annual and life cycles. When in their villages they produce a 
number of different agricultural commodities. As commuting labourers they work informally 
in formal industries, or on small construction projects. As circular migrants to remote cities 
they almost all work on the construction of buildings that become key infrastructural inputs in 
international processes of accumulation as the offices of major international companies, or 
the apartments of IT workers.20 
INSERT FIGURE 1 Mapping the three zones of work (villages, nearby cities (Dharwad and 
Hubli), and remote cities (Bangalore)) (map by Eseld Imms). 
Unlike those working a step or two from the shelves of European supermarkets or the clothes 
racks of high street stores, these workers are largely obscured from view. As agricultural 
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labourers at the ‘base’ of commodity chains 21  they produce a variety of crops (including 
paddy and cotton) in a prolonged labour process that is fragmented across time, task and farm. 
Their contribution is completed once bags of produce have been filled and loaded en route to 
mill and market. As informal workers in formal sector industries in Dharwad that are part-
owned by the Indian company Tata (owner of well-known brands like Jaguar) they are 
employed in peripheral tasks in canteens or as sweepers, and periodically removed when they 
have almost worked for enough successive months to be entitled to a formal contract; or they 
are brought into the factories by labour intermediaries who shield factory owners from 
pressure to implement labour laws. As construction labourers in Bangalore they leave the 
worksites before the offices of multinational companies are completed, and their erstwhile 
labour camps of open toilets and blue plastic tents have been greened for the incoming mostly 
white-collar workforce.  
The labourers in the fieldwork sites are, then, located in obscure parts of agricultural 
commodity chains, outside of core aspects of the labour process in industry, or between 
moments of accumulation in the construction sector. Analysis of how they are controlled, and 
how structural and associational power are denied to them, matters to understanding how 
increments in labouring class power might be fostered – not least because such informal 
unorganised labourers form a majority of the Indian population. 22  The focus here, then, is 
one step back from how structural power can lay the basis for associational power. Instead 
the article focuses on how such forms of power might be strengthened where both are largely 
absent. It concludes by underlining the significance of worksites within the two zones 
(wetland/circulation and dryland/commuting) that are directly linked to accumulation by 
international companies. In such locations labour has latent structural power and greater 
potential for associational power. Where these are realised, there are potential knock-on 
effects in more ‘obscure’ parts of the two zones. 
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As part of a broader attempt to put labour at the centre of the analysis of capitalist 
development 23  the article seeks to better understand how the power of labour might be 
increased by deploying a three-way characterisation of ‘labour control regimes’. This is used 
to analyse fieldwork data from the two south Indian districts of Raichur in north-east 
Karnataka and Dharwad in north-west Karnataka (see map). The article draws primarily on 
data collected in 2013-14, and secondarily on data collected from 2002 to 2011. While the 
broader fieldwork extended to over 30 villages, the focus here is on the four villages where 
fieldwork was conducted most recently – two irrigated villages from which labourers 
circulate to remote cities, and two dryland villages from which they commute. 24  As the 
analysis becomes more detailed it becomes increasingly focused on one dryland and one 
wetland village (in Dharwad and Raichur districts respectively), while discussion of the other 
two villages provides context within the two districts.  
The class-relational approach used here, which is informed by the considerable literature on 
Indian labour, 25  labour control, 26  and labour geography, 27  emphasises world-historical 
perspectives on capitalist development. It also goes beyond viewing class-as-stratification 
(where the focus is on distributions of assets and how that shapes market relations) to 
analysing social relations at the level of production.28 In other words, the emphasis is not just 




A three-way approach to labour control regimes  
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In order to put labour and class relations at the centre of the analysis of development, this 
article deploys a three-way approach to labour control regimes to better understand the 
possibilities for increasing the structural and associational power of people working at the 
margins of global production networks. This three-way approach is comprised of: i) a macro 
labour control regime shaped by the broader dynamics of competitive capitalist accumulation 
within India and beyond; ii) local labour control regimes; and iii) control within the labour 
process. The first and last aspects of this three-way approach relate to Banaji’s distinction 
between the ‘general forms of domination’ - understood as the (social) relations of production, 
or the totality of social relations at different levels in the circuit of capital - and the ‘concrete 
or specific ways’ in which capitalists control and deploy labour, which are understood as the 
immediate relations of exploitation, or forms of exploitation in the labour process. 29  The 
intermediate level of the ‘local labour control regime’ is introduced here in order to elaborate 
the ‘concrete and specific’, and to draw out its interplay with the general forms of 
domination.30  
 
As its broadest the ‘macro labour control regime’ is synonymous with capitalism, and the 
process of competitive accumulation based on exploitation that is intrinsic to it. Although 
capitalist labour relations may appear as forms of free exchange in the marketplace, labourers 
are compelled to enter the market to sell their labour-power as they lack sufficient assets for 
their material reproduction following gradual processes of socio-economic differentiation, or 
more dramatic ones of forcible dispossession.  Just as compulsion appears as freedom, so 
exploitation appears as fair exchange since wages obscure the appropriation of surplus value 
(the basis of accumulation and profit) through surplus labour time - the portion of the day 
when the labourer is no longer working for the costs of her own reproduction, but for the 
capitalist.31 Surplus-value is not only extracted from labour during the production process, 
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but also through rents charged for assets such as land and machinery; and through usury that 
can facilitate increased extraction of surplus-value in the production process as well as its 
appropriation through exchange. ‘Loans’, which act as a form of advance wage that increases 
access to labour-power, become ‘debts’ that can be used to press labourers to intensify their 
work-rate or extend surplus labour time.32 
Analysis of the labour process focuses on the actual forms of domination and exploitation 
experienced by rural-based labourers at the level of production, and how these are changing. 
The ‘local labour control regime’,  33 which is the intermediate component of this article’s 
framework, is understood here as being central to how broader capitalist dynamics are 
‘realised’ as actual forms of domination and exploitation within labour processes that shape 
labour’s material and political conditions. In other words, the local labour control regime 
links the macro labour control regime to actual forms of exploitation. It helps to explain why 
labourers in the fieldwork villages experience different degrees and forms of domination and 
exploitation. It does so by drawing into the analysis ‘local’ patterns of accumulation and 
labouring class reproduction, distributions of classes and castes (in effect the contemporary 
expression of past relations), and the most prominent forms of institutional mediation of class 
relations, which in this article’s fieldwork sites are those by local government institutions.  
 
Labouring class reproduction in the fieldwork areas is, as already noted, characterised by a 
blur of movement of labourers across sites of production. Nevertheless labouring households 
continue to be based in their home villages, which are therefore seen as the primary location 
for analysis of how labour control regimes are ‘realised’ as uneven material and politica l 
conditions. Two distinct local labour control regimes emerge from the fieldwork data 
analysed in this paper – one that is characterised by dryland agriculture and commuting (in 
the case of the Dharwad villages), and the other by wetland agriculture and circular migration 
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(in the case of the Raichur villages). The remainder of the article analyses the labour control 
regime in these two zones, and seeks out possibilities for collective action by labour. 
The macro labour control regime in India 
India’s relationship with the world-historical process of capitalist development, along with 
state policies that have sought to maximize the accumulation of Indian capital and its 
competitiveness in world markets, 34  have produced a macro-labour control regime that is 
characterized by particularly high levels of informality (meaning precarious and largely 
unregulated work) and segmentation (due to caste divisions). In 2009-10, 423 million of 
India’s total workforce of 460 million (92 per cent) were informally employed,35 meaning 
that they were afforded relatively little protection by social security and labour laws, worked 
without a written contract, and lacked representation. 36  During the 2000s the growth of 
informal jobs outstripped those of formal jobs by 60 million to 4 million. Over a quarter of 
the new informal jobs were in the formal sector, underlining how employment characterized 
by precarity, poor conditions, and low rates of pay is being extended into formal parts of the 
economy.37 Precarity, which is socially regulated by kin, caste and gender relations, as well 
as by class relations, 38  is compounded by the presence of a reserve army of labour that 
‘disciplines and disempowers those in work, discouraging them politically from struggles 
over the distribution of wages and profits’. 39 Unskilled workers, who generally receive the 
lowest wages, are the most vulnerable because they are the easiest to replace and tend to be 
less likely to organise. 
The absence of the state as an enforcer of its own rules on workplaces, and as a facilitator of 
workers’ access to social security, is in itself a form of control as it shapes the labour process 
in capital’s favour. This is a conscious strategy forged by the state’s proximity to capital 
(although not all individual capitals), 40  and its commitment to supporting capitalist 
10 
 
accumulation without jeopardising social stability or the supply of labour. The current more 
stridently neoliberal Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government is seeking to further increase 
levels of informality by raising the thresholds at which capitalists are legally required to 
implement labour legislation. The Contract Labour Act (which imposes limitations on the 
employment of contract labour) would apply to establishments with more than fifty workers 
rather than twenty as is currently the case, while the Factories Act (which includes 
regulations on health and safety, inspections, annual leave and working hours) would also 
apply to fewer establishments.41 Even though ways are often found to avoid legislation – by 
outsourcing, subcontracting, or making one production unit appear as two -42 the proposed 
legislation would further undermine labour’s ability to mobilize around the state. It would 
also worsen its material conditions by intensifying the labour process and increasing exposure 
to dangerous working and living conditions.  
As well as informality and state scarcity, India’s macro labour control regime is characterised 
by heightened levels of segmentation. Labouring class households are not just integrated into 
processes of accumulation and exploitation with different levels of intensity, visibility and 
bargaining power, they are also segmented by increasingly complex geographies of 
reproduction with most households working in multiple and changing locations, and often 
combining wage-labour with forms of petty self-employment. 43  To be more specific, a 
dwindling proportion of rural-based labouring class households continue to reproduce 
themselves primarily through agriculture in their home villages,44 while a growing number 
either commute to nearby cities or circulate to distant ones.45  
Segmentation is not driven solely by structural change. Like informalisation, it is also a 
conscious capitalist strategy that plays not only on spatial divisions, but also those of gender, 
task, wage level, religion, language, and caste. Caste is a particularly important form of 
segmentation in India, and one that cannot be separated from class as it ‘entails an ideology that 
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explains and legitimates the material differences of class and power relations’. 46 Where class 
overlaps more tightly with caste, ‘thicker’ social ties and loyalties strengthen the capacity of 
classes (those of both capital and labour) to act collectively.47 Greater caste heterogeneity, on 
the other hand, makes classes of labour easier to control.  
When viewed in concrete historical terms, then, class in rural India is not a singular identity 
but a plural one - in terms of its multiple forms of reproduction, but also in terms of the 
various axes of inequality/domination embedded within it.48 This moves us from the broad 
frame of competitive capitalist accumulation based on exploitation, and characterised in India 
by high levels of informality and segmentation, towards the specific forms of class relations 
in particular locations.  
The local labour control regime in rural north Karnataka 
Local labour control regimes are what mark out this paper’s contribution to analyses of labour’s 
political and material conditions. They are outlined here through five interrelated variables: i) patterns 
of accumulation, which are shaped by such things as geophysical variations, and linked to broader 
contexts through capital flows into and out of the ‘local’ area; ii) patterns of labouring class 
reproduction – narrowed down here to focus on the sphere of production, and on wage-labour rather 
than self-employment because wage-labour is the primary basis of household reproduction in the 
fieldwork villages; iii) local institutional dynamics – understood here primarily in terms of local 
government institutions and the ways in which they mediate class relations through the allocation of 
public resources; iv) the distribution of classes - understood here in the relatively simple terms of 
landholdings and whether a household is a net buyer or seller of labour power; 49  and v) the 
distribution of castes.  
The two fieldwork districts are located in historically distinct parts of the state, 50 and have 
contrasting development indicators. Raichur has the highest poverty levels in the state of 
Karnataka, and human development indicators comparable to India’s poorest states. Dharwad, 
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on the other hand, has poverty levels and HDIs close to state and national averages,51 and is 
also better-connected to major cities and ports. The data that are discussed in this section are 
based on surveys and interviews in 901 households in four villages (selected according to 
proximity to non-agricultural labour markets, levels of irrigation, and distributions of 
landholdings and caste).52 They illustrate variations between local labour control regimes, 
starting with patterns of accumulation.  
  
Patterns of accumulation 
Patterns of capitalist class accumulation and labouring class reproduction in each fieldwork 
village are shaped by distributions of irrigation, soil type, land, and castes (see Table 1). 
Higher levels of irrigation and better soils increase agricultural profitability. The two Raichur 
villages were canal- irrigated – 50 per cent in the case of Jagalwara and over 90 per cent in 
Shiva Camp. By contrast less than a fifth of the two dryland Dharwad villages were irrigated 
by borewells, and levels of agricultural profitability were lower. There were also significant 
differences in soil type – the least irrigated village (Panchnagaram) had mostly less 
productive red soil, while the second Dharwad village (Kamlapur), like both Raichur villages, 
had mostly black soil, which retains moisture much more effectively, and allows crops to 
withstand periods of low rainfall.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Canal- irrigated Shiva Camp’s larger agricultural surpluses led to greater investment in 
agribusiness (such as trading and milling) than in the other three villages combined. Profits 
from agriculture and agribusiness had financed postgraduate qualifications and formal sector 
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city jobs for the next generation53 – a trend made clear by data on the primary economic 
activities of individuals rather than households as a whole (see Table 3). 
In Panchnagaram village (in Dharwad district), meanwhile, lower levels of irrigation and 
poorer soils restricted agricultural accumulation, and encouraged members of its capitalist 
class to accumulate through the state. Their hand was strengthened by the fact that they were 
mostly from the same Lingayat caste that was politically dominant in the district as a whole. 
Of all the fieldwork villages Panchnagaram had the greatest number of public sector 
employees, the highest number of contractors, and had had more district councillors over the 
previous two decades. Meanwhile Kamlapur village (also in Dharwad) was dominated by a 
Maratha caste with little clout at district level. Its capitalist class’s accumulation strategies 
were more firmly linked to agriculture (see table 2). Jagalwara’s situation was similar.  
Accumulation strategies, then, had diversified in Shiva Camp (Raichur) through agribusiness 
and formal urban employment, and in Panchnagaram (Dharwad) through state-linked 
accumulation, more than in Jagalwara (Raichur) and Kamlapur (Dharwad), which remained 
more agriculture-focused (see tables 2 and 3). These variations shape interactions between 
classes in ways that will become apparent. 
INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 
Class and caste 
Levels of agricultural profitability correlate with levels of class/caste inequality (see Table 4). 
Shiva Camp, which had the highest levels of irrigation and agricultural profitability, also had 
the most uneven land distribution. Around 50 per cent of its households were landless, and 
those that were scheduled caste owned an average of less than half an acre (see Table 5). The 
Telugu-speaking dominant caste Reddys and Kammas, on the other hand, owned an average 
of nine irrigated acres. In other words the overlap between dominant caste and capitalist class 
14 
 
was pronounced. In nearby Jagalwara, larger landholdings were spread across more than one 
caste, while the largest community numerically (scheduled tribe Nayaks) was highly 
heterogeneous in class terms. The greater caste cohesion of the capitalist class in Shiva Camp 
and Panchnagaram than in villages like Jagalwara partially explains their greater economic 
diversification through agribusiness and politics. 
INSERT TABLES 4 and 5 
Local institutional dynamics 
The degree of capitalist class control over local government institutions (LGIs) is closely 
related to caste/class dynamics. Shiva Camp’s dominant castes had relatively little influence 
beyond the village limits where other castes were more influential. In Kamlapur and 
Jagalwara the class/caste dynamics were even less favourable from the perspective of the 
dominant. In Panchnagaram, on the other hand, the greater overlap between caste and class at 
village/gram panchayat (literally ‘village council’ but in practice usually a handful of 
villages)/district level gave its capitalist class greater scope to use public resources for its own 
economic and political ends, and as a basis of control over labourers who were more 
segmented in caste terms than in the other villages.54 
It was in the most iniquitous village of Shiva Camp that the share of public resources 
reaching the labouring class was at its lowest. NREGS (the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme) had not functioned for several years, and a sizeable minority did not have 
access to government subsidized foodgrains through the Public Distribution System. 55 The 
Gram Panchayat office was located some distance away in another village along barely 
navigable mud roads, and there was a general reluctance to make direct claims of it. In some 
nearby villages, though, the labouring class’s relative cohesion in caste terms had helped it to 
act collectively to make demands of local government institutions.56 Across the fieldwork 
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villages as a whole, local government institutions (LGIs) primarily mediated in favour of the 
capitalist class, but they also provided a basis for counter-moves by the labouring class. 
Labouring class reproduction 
Informal wage labour was the primary basis of reproduction for over 80 per cent of labouring 
class households in the fieldwork villages, self-employment the primary basis for around 15 
per cent, and formal employment for less than two per cent (see Table 6). Urban employment 
provided between one third and two thirds of labouring class households in the Dharwad 
fieldwork villages. The more tightly integrated into urban labour markets a particular village 
was, the more better-paid skilled workers it had.  
Kamlapur was more tightly integrated into urban labour markets than nearby Panchnagaram, 
which had a less polarised distribution of land and a greater variety of labouring class 
reproduction strategies within the village (including greater amounts of petty commodity 
production) (see Table 2). While the construction sector was the main source of non-
agricultural employment in Kamlapur, in Panchnagaram the primary sources were two Tata 
joint ventures manufacturing buses and construction machinery. Significantly members of 
capitalist households played a greater role in mediating access to industrial work than was the 
case for construction work.57 
INSERT TABLE 6 
The Raichur villages, meanwhile, were beyond commutable distance from any city. A 
majority of its labouring class households had migrated 500 kilometres to the construction 
sites of Bangalore at some point in the last decade. A sizeable minority continued to do so on 
a seasonal or temporary basis. Most were unskilled labourers, some were semi-skilled, and a 
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handful had become labour intermediaries - mostly from the dryer village of Jagalwara that 
had a more established migration stream.58  
Overall, labouring class reproduction in the Raichur villages was marked by wetland 
agriculture and circulation, and in the Dharwad villages by dryland agriculture and 
commuting. Kamlapur’s (in Dharwad) labourers were the least dependent on wage- labour in 
their home village, while Shiva Camp’s (in Raichur) were the most dependent (see Table 6). 
The labouring class was fragmented across living spaces in the Raichur villages because of 
circular migration. In Dharwad it was fragmented across a greater number of workplaces. 
Panchnagaram had the most homogenous and politically influential capitalist class, but the 
most segmented labouring class. More generally the Raichur villages had a greater degree of 
caste-based united within the labouring class than was the case in the Dharwad villages. How, 
then, did these broad variations in class relations interact with forms of domination and 
exploitation within the labour process to create labour’s uneven material and political 
conditions?  
Control within the labour process: comparing labour control regimes in Raichur and Dharwad  
Labour has been identified as having better material conditions and greater bargaining power 
in areas with stronger links to non-agricultural labour markets, better access to pro- labour 
state regulations and public welfare programmes, and histories of stronger labouring class 
organisation. 59  Labour regimes tend to be harsher in more remote villages where 
accumulation is more dependent on agriculture, and links to non-agricultural labour markets 
are weaker.60 These are patterns not rules: high levels of control over labour have also been 
identified in villages closer to urban centres,61 and in peri-urban settings.62  
It is at the level of production that labour control regimes take their concrete form (are 
imposed on ‘labouring bodies’), and that the labour control regimes in the wetland/circulation 
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and dryland/commuting zones can be compared. In the less remote dryland village 
(Panchnagaram in Dharwad) levels of accumulation through agriculture were lower, state-
linked forms of accumulation higher, and commuting provided a significant basis of 
labouring class reproduction. In Shiva Camp (in Raichur) levels of accumulation through 
agriculture and agribusiness, investment of surpluses outside of the local area were greater, 
and circular migration was a significant basis of labouring class reproduction (see Table 7).  
Labour relations in the irrigated village of Shiva Camp (Raichur), which had the highest 
levels of poverty, were marked by a re- intensification of direct capitalist control over labour, 
while in dryland Panchnagaram (Dharwad) they were marked by an intensification of indirect 
forms of control through the distribution of public resources. In both cases, ‘remote control’ 
through intermediaries became more common when labourers worked outside of their 
villages. 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
Re-intensifying control over labour: the labour control regime in a ‘wetland/circulation zone’  
Shiva Camp is relatively remote from non-agricultural labour markets. Its wages rise more 
slowly than road-side villages, and a greater proportion of its population live in extreme 
poverty, reside in mud houses, withdraw girl children from school to look after siblings, and 
experience health problems.63  
In the early 2000s the combination of a prolonged drought and the mechanisation of paddy 
harvesting in Shiva Camp i) accelerated the decline of levels of bonded labour, whereby 
labourers are bound into long-term debt-related ‘beck and call’ labour relations with 
particular farmers, and work up to fourteen hours per day, 64  and ii) triggered a wave of 
circular migration to the building sites of Bangalore. This loosening of labour relations went 
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hand- in-hand with an acceleration of mechanisation (see Table 1), a shift to less labour-
intensive crops, and the hiring in of paddy transplantation gangs from other areas.  
Despite some loosening of labour relations, levels of control over labour remained high. 
Three forms stood out – sharecropping and piece-rate arrangements at village- level, and 
‘remote control’ in the cities. Sharecropping amounted to highly exploitative forms of piece-
rated wage- labour, and involved around half of labouring class households (when fieldwork 
was last conducted in 2014). The ‘sharecroppers’ worked the land of their main employer and 
creditor, whose time was thereby freed up to pursue agribusiness ventures. They received 
inputs ‘on credit’ from him, transferred the harvest to him, and received their ‘share’ after 
input costs and ‘interest’ had been cut. For the duration of the ‘sharecropping’ agreement, one 
household member had to report to the landowner’s house every morning to work for around 
25 per cent less than the going rate for agricultural labour.65 Sharecropping, then, extends the 
process of exploitation across the household and across time, while interlocking mechanisms 
(combinations of buying labour-power, lending money to labourers, and trading inputs, 
output and essential commodities) ratchet up the overall rate of exploitation.66 
 
Piece-rate arrangements, which have become increasingly common, reduce the need for 
direct supervision of labour. In paddy transplantation work the working day is extended and 
intensified by the fact that wages are based on the area transplanted. Transplantation gangs 
are self-disciplining: gang leaders and physically stronger members press others to work 
faster, and exclude slower workers (the elderly, the inexperienced and the infirm). Rather 
than encouraging each other to ‘eat and get strength’, the lunch breaks of paddy 
transplantation gangs are cut short by the words ‘hurry and finish food’. 
The leaders of paddy transplantation gangs secure work, negotiate rates, pick workers, collect 
and distribute wages, and influence the pace of work. The farmer’s control over a gang (in 
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terms of both accessing labour-power and influencing the labour process) rises where he is 
able to influence the gang leader by providing her with loans or small additional payments. 
This allows farmers to ‘persuade’ gang leaders that paddy fields are smaller than they 
actually are. In other words, good relations with gang leaders are used to ‘covertly’ lower 
what are ostensibly fixed rate wages.  
The lowest wages in the Raichur villages were paid to its poorest households whose members 
were forced to ask for work, had the least bargaining power, and at times were even 
overlooked due to their need for prompt payment of wages. The degree and number of 
variations in the forms of wage-labour reflect labour’s high levels of segmentation, and 
underline the redundance of crude distinctions between free and unfree labour.  
Informality, segmentation and ‘remote-control’ beyond the village 
Most labouring class households in the Raichur fieldwork villages had circulated to 
Bangalore for work. Labour intermediaries (maistries) recruited these migrant labourers and 
often managed them on an everyday basis, providing a buffer between capital and labour, and 
reifying the spaces of class struggle by filtering demands, absorbing grievances, and reducing 
the incidence of collective action. Maistries usually recruited from their home areas, thereby 
reducing the chances of workers foot-dragging or disappearing because their families could 
be easily traced. Control was even tighter where intermediaries had ‘advanced’ money to 
labourers.  
‘Remote-control’ of labour physically detaches capital from labour, and facilitates 
flexibilisation and informalisation.67 Capital sidesteps most labour laws by recruiting through 
intermediaries, while also being under no compulsion to keep workers in employment. Its 
responsibilities are blurred by subcontracting chains, and labour has little ability to challenge 
employers that it would struggle to locate. The combination of informality, intermediation 
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and segmentation allows capital to maintain a relatively cheap, pliant and reliable workforce 
with little direct supervision and the ever-present fall-back of the reserve army of labour 
lurking both in the city’s labour mandis,68 and among labour intermediaries’ village networks. 
Although wage- labour was more regular and wages higher in Bangalore than in the 
countryside, 69  living conditions were harsher. Circular migrants working on the site of a 
Special Economic Zone in the north of the city lived in a tent camp, which was divided into 
sections according to where labourers were from. These workers, who were building the 
offices of IBM and Nokia (among others), slept on mud floors and defecated beside the path 
at the edge of their camp. The frequency of illness was widely reported to be greater than in 
migrants’ home villages. Although theoretically eligible, none of the respondents had 
accessed any of a range of government social security measures including the health-related 
provisions of the 2008 Unorganised Workers and Social Security Act (UWSSA).70 Had they 
been implemented none of the migrant labourers would have seen their socio-economic 
situation deteriorate as a result of migration. As it was, half of them did.  
Linking the levels 
The state is present in its absence from Bangalore’s construction sector. Its withdrawal from 
the enforcement of labour legislation shapes both the material conditions of labour and the 
competitiveness of capital. The state and construction capital share an interest in relatively 
cheaply produced commercial and domestic infrastructure, which increases accumulation in 
the real estate sector and provides relatively cheap rents for tenants like IBM, and for their 
employees. Like garment workers supplying high street stores, migrant construction workers 
contribute to the accumulation processes of well-known global brands, but their work is 
relatively invisible because it is completed before IBM move in. Unlike garment workers 
whose exploitation continues during the accumulation processes of well-known companies, 
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there is a ‘temporal rupture’ between the exploitation of construction workers and the 
appropriation of surplus-value by companies like IBM. Consequently labourers’ latent 
structural power does not materialise, and they are left exposed to the kinds of working and 
living conditions that shorten lives. 
Links between the state and the construction sector also take more specific forms – through 
the lobbying efforts of construction industry associations, for example ; or through the fact 
that some MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly) have built their political careers 
through the construction sector and so can provide a legislative ‘beach-head’ for industry 
lobbyists; or through the more prosaic everyday interactions through which labour 
department officials and industry managers are complicit in the evasion of state regulations 
on the ground. 71  The bluntness of the regulatory regime was underlined by Labour 
Department officials in Bangalore. Unable to enforce legislation, they had asked construction 
companies to comply with regulations of their own accord.72 
In Bangalore, then, labourers found their living and working conditions shaped by the 
broader capitalist dynamics of the macro capitalist control regime - accumulation in a 
competitive world capitalist system manifested in its political form through pro-capital state 
practices that create and maintain informal flexible working places, dangerous labour 
processes, and poor living conditions with no meaningful outlet for grievances.  
The labour control regime affecting migrant construction workers encompasses their home 
villages as well as Bangalore. Given Shiva Camp’s relatively steep social hierarchies and the 
almost complete subordination of its Gram Panchayat to the capitalist class, circular 
migration to Bangalore was a key means of contesting class relations. This in turn prompted 
farmers to re-work forms of control over labour, and to prevent some labourers from leaving 
through the renewal of debt-related ties and sharecropping arrangements (as outlined above). 
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At the same time growing levels of mechanisation and a diversification of accumulation 
strategies out of the village continue to reinforce outmigration by reducing employment in the 
village. . The key point is that the three levels of the labour control regime are interrelated  
across the wetland/circulation and dryland/commuting zones, and each level has to be 
analysed in each zone in order to understand differences in the labour process and the 
unevenness of material and political conditions. 
 
Reproducing domination through the state: the labour control regime in a 
‘dryland/commuting zone’ 
The labour control regime in Panchnagaram (Dharwad), which is located in a 
‘dryland/commuting zone’, differs from that of Shiva Camp. Its farmers’ ability to control 
male workers through labour relations was weakened by labourers’ easy access to non-
agricultural labour markets.  This was evident in farmers’ perceptions of their declining 
ability to control labour and maintain the intensity of the labour process. For example, a large 
landowner from a Dharwad village that was slightly closer to the city than Panchnagaram 
lamented the tightening of labour markets and the fact that there was now less scope to ‘pick 
and choose the best workers’. In a partially canal- irrigated village that was considerably 
further from the city (just beyond commutable distance), farmers made no reference to non-
agricultural employment, but pointed the finger very firmly at ‘bogus’ government schemes – 
by which they primarily meant the recent (2013) expansion of the public distribution system 
(of subsidised foodgrains), and, to a lesser degree, NREGS (employment on public works ). 
Prominent local councillors joked about the fact that NREGS remained largely 
unimplemented during a public discussion in the gram panchayat office.73  
23 
 
Back in Panchnagaram village, where accumulation strategies were somewhat more 
diversified, large farmers were not unduly concerned about government programmes and 
pointed to the growth of industrial employment as the primary ‘problem’. Here, compared to 
Shiva Camp in Raichur, there were i) fewer cases of bonded labour; ii) more cases of land 
leased on a cash basis rather than on a sharecropping basis; 74 iii) fewer agricultural machines 
and a slower shift to less labour- intensive crops (both of which are in part a means of 
disciplining labour); and iv) more sources of credit (including employers in the town and 
labour intermediaries, of whom there were more than in the circulation stream between 
Raichur and Bangalore).  
The capitalist class’s response to its declining levels of direct control over labour in 
Panchnagaram’s sphere of production was three-fold. Firstly it acted as gatekeeper to some 
forms of non-agricultural employment (those in industry rather than those in construction). 
Secondly it increased its control over female labourers. 75 Thirdly it used its control over the 
distribution of public resources through local government institutions to heighten its control 
over labour’s reproduction.76 The execution of this strategy was made easier by the relative 
caste-cohesion and broader political influence of Panchnagaram’s dominant class. Its 
significance was underlined by women from the poorest households in the village express ing 
fear about losing their ‘ration cards’ (that provide access to government-subsidised 
foodgrains through the ‘Public Distribution System’), which were all that stood between them 
and chronic under-nutrition. During the 2000s Gram Panchayat budgets had increased tenfold 
and amounted, by the end of the decade, to more than one third of below poverty line 
incomes. Dependence on those distributing public resources had never been greater.  
Even those labouring class households that were somewhat better off and more independent 
of the village said that there was no point in rocking the boat, which was seen both as futile 
and a sure way to undermine access to public resources in the future. Meanwhile, underlining 
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that labour control regimes do not only represent an entanglement of contested social relations, but 
also perceptions of those relations, politically influential men projected their power by inviting  
prominent local politicians to their homes – part of the process of maintaining control over labour 
without bearing the full costs of its reproduction. 77  Two conclusions can be drawn: uneven 
distributions of public resources (both at a given point in time, and over time) segment and 
discipline labour,78 and perceptions of power permeate the production process even while appearing 
to be external to it.  
Like the circular migrants in Bangalore, Panchnagaram’s commuters usually accessed work 
in the city through intermediaries. Those working in construction generally did so through 
fellow members of the labouring class, while access to industrial work was largely mediated 
by members of the dominant class/caste. These intermediaries shielded Tata from its 
responsibilities as a formal sector employer. Over ninety per cent of those working in its 
factories were informally employed, and although most had payments for social security 
deducted from their wages, in practice less than ten per cent had actually accessed social 
security payments. Most were either periodically laid-off to keep their employment informal, 
or they worked on a seasonal or part-time basis anyway.  
Commuting labourers in Dharwad were segmented across a greater number of worksites and 
sectors than their circulating counterparts in Bangalore. Moreover access to non-agricultural 
employment was often segmented along lines of caste and religious community. 79  Living 
conditions, though, were notably better - almost all Dharwad commuters lived in concrete 
houses and had access to Public Distribution System (government subsidised) foodgrains. 
Largely absent in the worksites, the state re-emerges in Dharwad’s villages to mediate class 
relations. It provides resources for both capital and labour, and helps to forestall the chances 
of labour mobilising in pursuit of its interests.  
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Local labour control regimes and socio-political change 
There are similarities and differences in the ways in which commuting and circulation shaped 
class relations at village level. In remote irrigated Shiva Camp, where agriculture is more 
profitable, labour was more tightly controlled – through greater dependence on village-based 
wage- labour and credit, and weaker mediation of class relations by state programmes. Steep 
social hierarchies at village- level heightened the significance of non-agricultural employment 
as a basis for challenging the status quo at home. They also limited the possibilities for more 
individualised negotiations with capital. Contestation of class relations in Shiva Camp 
requires collective action – something that had happened in the area through an organisation 
of female labourers who were almost all from the most numerous caste within the labouring 
class.80  
Circular migration from Shiva Camp had triggered slight socio-political gains. On their return 
home from Bangalore, many labourers appeared more assertive, emboldened by experiences 
elsewhere and a reduced dependence on capitalist farmers at home. Socio-political gains were, 
though, dissipated by the ongoing process of circulation, which scattered workers between 
the countryside and the city, making any collective impetus for change unlikely. Spatial 
segmentation, in other words, forestalls sustained collective action by the labouring class, and 
socio-political gains are more likely to be episodic, discursive, and symbolic than embedded 
or sustained. 
Elsewhere in the ‘wetland/circulation zone’, labourers’ latent structural power, which is 
derived from their ‘imminent’ contribution to the profits of prominent international 
companies like IBM, remained unrealised. Their bargaining power with regard to 
construction capital was almost non-existent. Living and working conditions were poor, 
social security provisions generally unfulfilled, and government regulations routinely flouted. 
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Nevertheless, in the labour camp, younger married men, who had formerly been bonded 
labourers, were unequivocal in their preference for being in Bangalore away from demeaning 
relations with landlords. 
 
Like their counterparts in Bangalore, the latent structural power of commuters in the 
Dharwad village, which was derived from their working for the well-known international 
company Tata, remained unrealised – stymied by segmentation, informality and ‘remote-
control’. Village- level socio-political gains accruing from commuting (which reduced 
dependence upon dominant village households) were not dissipated by the spatial 
segmentation that constrained circular migrants. Patterns of access to urban labour markets 
were reflected in labouring class critiques of the village’s dominant men, and a clearly stated 
desire not to work for them. Such criticisms were most clearly articulated in those 
communities (castes or religious groups) with the highest levels of commuting, while 
labouring class households that were more dependent on the village economy and received a 
greater share of resources from gram panchayat-administered programmes were unlikely to 
be critical.81  
Although non-agricultural employment had brought slight economic and socio-political gains 
across both the ‘wetland/circulation zone’ and the ‘dryland/commuting zone’, classes of 
labour remained segmented and unorganized, while the capitalist class was better able to 
project its interests – by sidestepping labour regulations in the cities, by re-working its 
control over labour in the villages (either directly or through control over local government 






Informal labour working at the margins of global production networks has little associational 
and structural power. This article has developed and deployed a three-way approach to labour 
control regimes, which includes analysis of the local labour control regime, to unravel the 
mechanisms that constrain labour’s political and material position, and the possibilities for 
change. Although lacking associational and structural power, informal labourers in India have 
numbers on their side as they constitute a majority of the population. In addition, Indian 
labour’s growing significance to the world economy is likely to increase its structural power 
– particularly as China begins to move away from low-waged production, opening the way 
for India to follow its global presence in the services sector with an expansion of its role in 
manufacturing. In this context, the kind of latent structural power referred to above – through 
working directly or indirectly for companies like Tata and IBM – is likely to increase. 
Each of the three levels of the labour control regime framework explored in this paper sheds 
light on how structural and associational power can be augmented. Macro labour control 
regimes are critical to locating Indian labour in its world-historical context. In general terms 
this means that it is subject to capitalism’s compulsion to exploit and accumulate in a global 
context. In more specific terms, it is subject to particularly high levels of informality because 
these lower labour costs and enhance the competitiveness of India’s fast-growing economy.  
While the macro labour control regime explains Indian labour’s posit ion in broad terms, it 
does not account for the marked differences in labour’s material conditions, and its ability to 
act collectively in its interests and affect pro- labouring class change (its political conditions). 
Analysis of the local labour control regime, which is in effect a prism of intersecting 
determinations including distributions of land and castes, levels of irrigation and soil types, 
and patterns of capitalist class accumulation and labouring class reproduction (in other words 
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the broad patterns of class relations), is critical for explaining these variations, and for 
developing pro- labour strategies that are sensitive to the specificities of class relations in 
particular places while being part of broader movements.  
The state in India promotes informality by avoiding mediation of class relations at the level of 
production through the enforcement of labour standards or the provision of social ‘insurance’. Instead, 
it subsidises labour’s reproduction in order to protect social stability, reduce capital’s labour costs, 
and facilitate global competitiveness. The uneven ways in which it mediates class relations through 
public employment and other programmes reflects the local labour control regime. In the fieldwork 
villages those mediations tend to strengthen the position of the dominant, while also contributing to 
counter-moves to advance the position of labour. 
Forms of control at the level of production, while shaped by the labour control regime as a 
whole, take on specific forms within the performance of time-rated, piece-rated and 
subcontracted wage- labour. More directly coercive forms of control over labour were 
associated with more remote (and irrigated) villages with steeper social and economic 
hierarchies, weaker access to non-agricultural employment and government programmes, and 
greater levels of poverty. Meanwhile more indirect forms of control (through access to 
government resources and employment in industry) were associated with villages with 
stronger access to non-agricultural labour markets.  
‘Remote control’, or the growing intermediation of labour relations that physically distances 
capitalists from labourers, reflects the changing spatial patterns of competitive accumulation 
and simple reproduction. Where the links between village and urban labour market are 
diffuse, as in some Dharwad villages, labour is less tightly controlled than in the longer and 
‘narrower’ channels between village and city in Raichur.   
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Analysis of the local labour control regime has been central to the tentative conclusions about 
pro-labouring class strategy based on this article’s comparative analysis of 
‘wetland/circulating’ and ‘dryland/commuting’ zones. In the Raichur villages steeper social 
hierarchies make less direct forms of struggle around access to state programmes the most 
feasible form of action. In Panchnagaram (Dharwad), the search for access to social security 
in Tata’s formal sector workplaces is a potential source of collective action. Tata’s global 
visibility accords those working for it the kind of structural power that workers on Dharwad’s 
many small construction sites lack. The concretisation of this structural power would require 
concerted union organising. Similar claims by unskilled circular migrants in Bangalore would 
not only require union organising, but, given that this is such hostile terrain for labouring 
class organisation, would also need the mobilisation of a greater number of national and 
international allies.  
This article’s main argument, which has been made implicitly throughout the paper, is essentially 
about method. The conclusions reached, which are based on analysis of the labour control 
regime, do not offer any blueprint or typology, nor do they necessarily indicate the most 
appropriate pro- labouring class strategies in Dharwad and Raichur, which will change over 
time. What they do seek to underline is a method of analysis that is sensitive to the ‘local’ 
specificities of class relations; which responds to the dynamism of class struggle; and which 
moves between the particular and the general rather than simply using case studies to inform 
broader arguments. In other words, instead of a single movement from one level of analysis to 
another there should be a constant movement between all levels of analysis.  
It is valid but somewhat banal to state that finding ways to strengthen the organisation of 
informal workers (in part by analysing multi- layered labour control regimes) is critical for the 
material and political conditions of labourers working at the margins of global production 
networks. Research aimed at reducing the degrees of violence of everyday labour relations in 
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contemporary India requires more precision. This article has sought to increase the visibility 
of migrant construction workers, ‘floating’ industrial workers, and those whose labour is 
scattered across unseen fields. It has sought to make their links to broader processes of 
surplus-value creation a little more obvious, and their routes to greater structural and 
associational power a little clearer. In order to do so it has developed the notion of the local 
labour control regime, and attempted to move between exploitation at the level of production 
and the world-historical dynamics of competitive capitalist accumulation.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of fieldwork villages (source: fieldwork data). 








Distance from city 12 12 100 75 
Distance from 
Industrial Park 
7 18 n.a n.a 
Land Value Highest 2nd 3rd Lowest 
% of land irrigated 
(and type)82 
12 (Borewell) 18 (Borewell) 96 (canal) 52 
(Canal/river) 
Soil Type Mostly red Mostly Black >90% black >90% black 
Profitability of 
Agriculture 








Highest    
Head of Oxen (as a 
proxy for 
mechanisation) 
0.5 0.5 0.2 (most 
mechanised) 
0.4 
























Formal Business 0 0 2.5 0 
Informal 
Business 
8.7 2.7 10.3 2 
Regular Formal 
Employment 












4.1 4.8 5 5 
Farming 73.8 85 67 91 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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Table 3: Number of individuals as percentage of total number of households involved in 
various economic activities (not including farming where farming is main occupation) 









Formal Business 0 0 2.5/6 0 
Informal 
Business 
10.7 8.8 48.8 4.1 
Regular Formal 
Employment 






1.8 2.4 17.1 0 
Public Sector 
Employment 







19.6 10.8 9.9 10.2 
 
Table 4: Distribution of land in the four fieldwork villages (source: fieldwork data) 
Amount of 
Land (Acres) 









10+ Mostly irrigated   7.6 2 
 Mostly dry 3.9 11.3  4 
5-10 Mostly irrigated   10 3.6 
 Mostly dry 9.2 11.9  6.9 
2.5-5 Mostly irrigated   9.4 8.3 
 Mostly dry 19 10.6  8.3 
0-2.5 Mostly irrigated   23.4 21.7 
 Mostly dry 36.9 20.5  28.2 
0  31 45.7 49.6 17 





Table 5: Distribution of castes in the four fieldwork villages with average landholdings in 









Dominant Caste Lingayats 
(including some OBC Lingayat 
sub-castes) 
47.6 (3.74) 11.6 (4.97) 2.2 (1.5) 14.5 (3.98) 
Dominant Caste Marathas  0 25.4 (6.92) 0 0 
Dominant Caste Reddys and 
Kammas 
0 0 21.9 (9) 0 
OBCs (Kurubas and Uppars) 16.4 (2.75) 12.3 (3.83) 24.1 (1.6) 8 (5.11) 
Muslims 15.2 (0.97) 32.9 (1.18) 0  10.5 (1.84) 
Scheduled Tribes 12.5 (2.3) 2.7 (1) 12.4 (1.5) 45.2 (2.9) 
Scheduled Castes  8.3 (0.22) 13 (0.9) 37.2 (0.42) 20.2 (1.2) 
Others 0 2.1 (6.33) 2.2 (2.2) 1.6 (3.25) 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 6: Patterns of labouring class reproduction in the fieldwork villages (source: fieldwork 
data) 













 76.9 82 83.8 84.9 
 Casual Employment 
(agriculture) 
48 25 59.8 61.9 
Casual Employment 
(commuting) 




0 0 16.4 22.4 
Regular Employment 
(informal) 









 16.6 14 14 13.4 
Self-
Employment 
Mix of farming 
(agricultural PCP) 
and wage-labour 
3.4 8 5.4 6.1 
 Non-agricultural PCP 
(including goat-
rearing) 
13.2 6 8.6 7.3 
Total  100 100 100 100 
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(Capitalist Class)  
Panchnagaram 
(Dharwad) 
1st 2nd negligible 
Shiva Camp 
(Raichur) 






1st 2nd negligible 
Shiva Camp 
(Raichur) 
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